Assessment Relativism by Ferrari, Filippo
  
1 
Assessment Relativism 
Filippo Ferrari (Universität Bonn) 
 
 
Abstract 
Assessment relativism, as developed by John MacFarlane, is the view that the 
truth of our claims involving a variety of English expressions—‘tasty’, ‘knows’, 
‘tomorrow’, ‘might’, and ‘ought’—is relative not only to aspects of the context of 
their production but also to aspects of the context in which they are assessed. 
Assessment relativism is thus a form of truth relativism which is offered as a new 
way of understanding perspectival thought and talk. In this article, I present the 
main theses of assessment relativism, focusing in particular on highlighting the 
points of commonality and contrast with other forms of truth relativism. I then 
offer some critical remarks concerning the motivation of assessment relativism in 
relation to matters of taste.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Assessment relativism (henceforth AR) is a type of truth relativism,1 that has been 
developed by John MacFarlane in a series of works,2 culminated in his 2014 book 
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.  
                                                        
1 See García-Carpintero and Kölbel 2008 for a variety of models of relative truth. 
2 The view is first sketched in MacFarlane 2003. 
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Relativism about truth is the thesis that (some) truths are true merely relatively. 
This view is mainly motivated by the attempt of making sense of the possibility of 
disputes where none of the competing opinions seems less legitimate, or less true, 
than the others. This phenomenon is known under the label “faultless 
disagreement” and, roughly put, it concerns situations where one party accepts 
while the other rejects that things are so-and-so but neither of them is, not even in 
principle, off-track and guilty of any mistake.3  
 
To get a proper grip on AR and to distinguish it from other versions of truth 
relativism, three questions are particularly relevant: (i) which truths are relative 
and which aren’t?—section 2; (ii) what is truth relativism and what are the bearers 
of (relative) truth?—section 3; (iii) in what sense is truth relative according to 
AR?—sections 4-6. Section 7 discusses two challenges to AR. 
 
2. The scope of assessment relativism 
 
AR is a local thesis targeting a restricted range of truths. Its exact range of 
application is ultimately an empirical question, having to do with whether and to 
what extent a given language—e.g. English—contains expressions which are apt 
for a relativistically-engineered notion of truth. MacFarlane takes ‘tasty’, ‘knows’, 
‘tomorrow’, ‘might’, and ‘ought’ to be paradigmatic examples of expressions 
which are apt for AR. As a litmus test for detecting the presence of AR, 
                                                        
3 Kölbel 2003 takes faultless disagreement as the main motivation for truth 
relativism. Rovane 2013 offers some criticisms to this strategy. 
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MacFarlane suggests to look not only at the phenomenon of faultless disagreement 
but also at that of retraction—a speech act targeting a previously made assertion 
which speakers perform by saying things like “I retract that”, “I no longer stand by 
that”. I will leave the question whether retraction has an adequate empirical 
support to experimental philosophers—see, for instance, Knobe and Yalcin 2014, 
Marques 2018, and Wright 2007—focusing on introducing, explaining, and 
assessing the theoretical framework of AR in relation to one specific application—
matters of taste. 
 
3. What is truth relativism? 
 
To understand the mechanics of AR, we need first to understand the general thesis 
of relative truth. A natural starting point is to ask what are the bearers of (relative) 
truth. In this regard, a distinction between utterances, sentences, and propositions 
has to be made. Utterances are speech acts. They typically involve the use of a 
language and the intentional acts of speakers at a certain time and place. Sentences 
are linguistic expressions. They constitute the smallest unity of meaning that can 
be assessed for truth and falsity. Propositions are non-linguistic items that are 
taken to be the content of declarative uses of sentences. Clearly, two speakers can 
say the same thing by uttering different sentences, whether in the same or different 
languages. That same thing is the proposition expressed by those sentences. Sarah 
in uttering the English sentence “John is a philosopher” expresses the proposition 
that John is a philosopher; Elisabetta in uttering the Italian sentence “John è un 
filosofo” expresses the very same proposition expressed by the sentence uttered by 
Sarah. 
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So, what are the primary bearers of truth? It sounds infelicitous to say that a 
speech act of uttering—e.g. Sarah’s uttering “John is a philosopher”—is true or 
false. Strictly speaking, an act of uttering might be correct or incorrect, appropriate 
or inappropriate, but it is not true or false.4 Thus, we are left with either sentences 
or propositions to play the role of primary truth bearers. MacFarlane opts for 
propositions. One reason for this, as we will see, is that it’s easier to capture the 
kind of relativity at the core of AR (MacFarlane 2014, ch.3). 
 
Let’s now introduce a standard piece of semantic machinery, the so-called 
“Kaplanian two-dimensional semantics”. In his seminal paper “Demonstratives” 
(Kaplan 1989), operating within the framework of compositional semantics,5 
Kaplan distinguishes two aspects of meaning: character and content. The character 
of a linguistic expression—a sentence or a sub-sentential expression—reflects 
semantic rules governing how the content of that expression may vary from one 
context of use to the next. The sentence “I am a philosopher” contains the 
indexical expression ‘I’ which is governed by the following rule: ‘I’ refers to the 
user (speaker or writer). Such a sentence expresses different propositions in 
different contexts, depending on who’s using it. As used by MacFarlane, it 
expresses the proposition that MacFarlane is a philosopher, while as used by 
Merkel it expresses the proposition that Merkel is a philosopher. These two 
                                                        
4   For a dissenting voice, see García-Carpintero (this volume). 
5 Compositional semantics provides rules governing the interpretation of 
subsentential expressions and their modes of combination in order to explain how 
the meaning of whole sentences is determined by the meanings of their parts. 
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propositions might have different truth values: in fact, in the actual world, the 
former is true while the latter is false. Formally, the character of a linguistic 
expression is a function from contexts to contents—where a context, in its abstract 
sense, is a possible occasion of use of an expression that can be individuated as a 
sequence of parameters including an agent, a world, a time, a location. The second 
aspect of the meaning of a linguistic expression is the content. If the expression in 
question is a sentence, the content will be a proposition, whereas if it is a sub-
sentential expression—e.g. a name or a predicate—the content will be an object, 
an individual, or a property. Formally, the content is represented by a function 
from circumstances of evaluation to an appropriate extension. By “circumstances 
of evaluation” Kaplan means  
 
[B]oth actual and counterfactual situations with respect to which it is 
appropriate to ask for the extensions of a given well-formed expression. A 
circumstance will usually include a possible state or history of the world, a 
time, and perhaps other features as well.” (Kaplan 1989: 502).  
 
The sentence “snow is white” expresses the same propositions in all contexts, but 
whether it is true will depend on the world at which it is evaluated: in the actual 
world the proposition expressed is true, but in a possible world where snow isn’t 
white, it would be false.  
 
What other information beside possible worlds should be included in the 
circumstances is “a matter of language engineering” (Kaplan 1989: 504). If we 
think, like temporalists do, that the sentence “Filippo is writing” expresses a 
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temporally neutral content—i.e. a proposition which doesn’t contain any 
information about the time at which Filippo is writing—then we might include a 
time-parameter in the circumstances in order to assess whether the proposition 
expressed by such a sentence is true or false. If we consider as the relevant value 
of the time parameter in the circumstances Wednesday, 26-12-2018 at 9am, then 
the proposition expressed is true, whereas if we consider Wednesday, 26-12-2018 
at 3am, the proposition is false.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that the use of a sentence always occurs in a context 
which contains information about the time and the world at which the sentence is 
used by an agent. However, if we believe that modally and temporally neutral 
contents should be allowed for, such information provided by the context does not 
leak in the proposition. Nevertheless, the context at which the sentence is used—
let’s call it, following Kaplan, the context of use—provides the default values of 
the relevant parameters (i.e. time and world in our example) in the circumstances 
of evaluation. Thus, if Filippo is uttering the sentence “Filippo is writing” in the 
actual world on December the 26th 2018 at 9am, the context in which such a 
sentence is used by Filippo will contain information about the world and the time 
at which it is used. If we then want to assess whether the proposition expressed by 
that sentence—i.e. the proposition that Filippo is writing—is true or false in 
relation to the context in which it is used, we fill the world and time values in the 
circumstances of evaluation with the information provided by the context of use. 
In this sense we can talk of the circumstances of the context of use. 
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The context of use thus plays two distinct roles, as MacFarlane puts it: a content-
determining role—which proposition is expressed depends on features of the 
context of use—and a circumstances-determining role, selecting the circumstances 
of evaluation that are relevant to assess the truth of the proposition. To these two 
roles of the context of use correspond two ways in which a sentence can be 
context-sensitive: it can be use-indexical in that it expresses different propositions 
at different contexts of use (e.g. “I am a philosopher”); or, it can be use-sensitive 
in that it expresses the same proposition at all contexts of use but its truth depends 
on features of the circumstance of the context of use (e.g. “Filippo is writing” is, 
according to temporalists, use-sensitive but not use-indexical).  
 
As we can now appreciate, that sentence truth is relative because the sentence is 
use-indexical, is a mundane kind of relativity. A more interesting relativity occurs 
once the proposition is fixed for all contexts, and yet its truth value might vary 
from one context to the next. If temporalism is true, my utterance of “Filippo is 
writing” as used by me on 26-12-2018 at 11am expresses the proposition that 
Filippo is writing which is true as evaluated at the circumstance of the context of 
use but false when evaluated at different circumstances of evaluation (e.g., on 26-
12-2018 at 3am).  
 
4. Non-indexical-contextualism as truth relativism 
 
The idea of use-sensitivity without use-indexicality was adapted by some 
relativists to model the intuitive talk of relative truth in some domains—e.g., that 
of taste (see Egan 2007, Kölbel 2002, Recanati 2008, Richard 2008). The thought 
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is to take Kaplan’s framework and to enrich the circumstances of evaluation with a 
taste parameter tracking the gustatory sensibility of the speaker. According to this 
model—known as Non-Indexical-Contextualism (NIC for short)—an utterance of 
a sentence containing a taste predicate—e.g. ‘oysters are tasty’—expresses the 
same proposition in all contexts of use—i.e., the proposition that oysters are 
tasty—but its truth-value varies from one context of use to the next in tandem with 
variation in the agent’s gustatory sensibility. Thus “oysters are tasty” would 
invariably express the proposition that oysters are tasty which is true as used by 
me but false as used by my brother. In short, according to NIC the truth of taste 
propositions is relative to the gustatory sensibility operating at the context of use. 
In this way NIC effectively accounts for faultless disagreement. If, in claiming 
“these oysters are tasty”, I endorse the proposition that these oysters are tasty 
while my brother, in claiming “nah, these oysters are not tasty”, endorses the 
proposition that these oysters aren’t tasty, we would disagree but each of us would 
say something true relative to our respective contexts of use. Because there’s 
nothing wrong in endorsing a true proposition, there’s a clear sense in which our 
disagreement is faultless.  
 
Whether the truth relativity exemplified by NIC deserves the honorific title of 
“genuine truth relativism” is open to discussion. MacFarlane thinks that since NIC 
preserves an element of absolutism it doesn’t count as a thoroughgoing form of 
relativism. Once we take the proposition used by an agent and we pair it with the 
context of use we get a once-and-for-all truth value. This is sometimes expressed, 
perhaps misleadingly, by saying that within NIC utterance truth is absolute 
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(MacFarlane 2014: 107).6 Take the sentence “oysters are tasty” as uttered by me. 
Given that there is one privileged context of use—that of my utterance—there’s a 
privileged default value for the taste parameters in the circumstances of 
evaluation. In this sense, the question whether the proposition expressed by the 
sentence “oysters are tasty” as used by me is true has a unique and absolute 
answer.  
 
5. Assessment Relativism 
 
If we want to cross “the philosophically interesting line between truth absolutism 
and truth relativism [we need to] relativize truth not just to a context of use [...] but 
also to a context of assessment” (MacFarlane 2014: 60). Thus, what makes a view 
about truth a genuinely relativistic one is not the mere addition of a special 
parameter in the circumstances of evaluation—e.g., a taste parameter—but rather 
the addition of a new context besides the context of use—i.e., a context of 
assessment. Such a context, which is structurally analogous to the context of use, 
                                                        
6 MacFarlane can express this point without using the notion of utterance truth but 
that of accuracy instead: “an attitude or speech act occurring at c1 is accurate, as 
assessed from a context c2, just in case its content is true as used at c1 and assessed 
from c2” (MacFarlane 2014: 127). For NIC an utterance made by Ben of "oysters 
are tasty" in context c1 and an utterance of "oysters aren't tasty" made by Bob in c2 
can both be accurate as assessed from any context. AR predicts that the accuracy 
of Ben's utterance precludes the accuracy of Bob's utterance. Thus, utterance's 
accuracy is invariant in NIC but not in AR. 
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is a possible situation in which a use of a sentence might be assessed. Its primary 
function is to provide the value for the special parameters.  
 
This gives the semantic machinery an interesting twist. In fact, AR can be defined 
as the thesis that the truth of certain propositions—i.e. those that are expressed by 
a use of sentences containing assessment-sensitive expressions—is relative not 
only to aspects of the context of use but also to aspects of a context of assessment. 
Focusing on taste propositions, MacFarlane characterizes assessment-relative truth 
as follows:  
 
REL — A proposition p is true as used at the context of use (c1) and 
assessed from a context of assessment (c2) if and only if p is true at 
<wc1,gc2>, where wc1 is the world of c1 and gc2 is the taste of the agent of 
c2 (the assessor). (MacFarlane 2014: 105)  
 
While the job of c1 is that of determining the proposition expressed, that of c2 is to 
provide the values for the gustatory parameter (g) in the circumstances of 
evaluation. To illustrate: I’m at the restaurant with my brother and I claim: 
“oysters are tasty”. Here the context of use (c1) is the context in which I utter the 
sentence “oysters are tasty”. It determines the proposition expressed—namely the 
proposition that oysters are tasty—and it fixes the default value of the world 
parameter in the circumstances of evaluation (wc1)—i.e., the actual world. Since 
there is no use-indexical expression, such a content remains invariant across 
contexts. The role of a context of assessment (c2) is that of providing the value for 
the taste parameter in the circumstances of evaluation (gc2) which determines 
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whether the extension of ‘tasty’ includes the oysters (making the proposition true) 
or not (making it false). Since I like the oysters while my brother dislikes them, 
the proposition that oysters are tasty is true as assessed from my context of 
assessment but false as assessed from my brother’s context of assessment. In this 
way, AR can account for the possibility of faultless disagreement.7 
 
REL shows the formal difference between AR and NIC. While the two views 
agree that an utterance of “oysters are tasty” invariantly expresses a single 
proposition, they disagree about what gustatory standard is relevant for assessing 
the truth of the proposition expressed. According to NIC the default value for the 
relevant standard is provided by the context of use whereas according to AR it is 
provided by a context of assessment. At first sight, this might look an insignificant 
difference. On a closer look, though, it has important consequences since it frees 
AR from the residual element of absolutism that affects NIC. Given that there’s no 
privileged context of assessment which sets the default value of the taste 
parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, in AR utterance truth isn’t absolute. 
Even keeping fixed the context of use and the proposition expressed, we don’t get 
a once and for all truth value.8 Moreover, relativising truth to both the context of 
use and a context of assessment has important normative consequences, to which 
we now turn. 
 
6. The normative profile of assessment relativism 
                                                        
7 While AR and NIC agree on the relevant notion of faultlessness, they work with 
different notions of disagreement. See MacFarlane 2014: 132. 
8 See footnote 6 for an elaboration of this point. 
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Dummett argued that to have a proper grasp of what truth is, we need not merely 
to know under what circumstances propositions are true, but also to understand the 
connection between their truth and the proprieties of their use (Dummett 1959). 
Following Dummett, MacFarlane discusses at length the practical difference that 
his theory makes with respect to the making and retracting of assertion. Starting 
with the idea that truth is the core—not necessarily the sole—normative notion of 
assertion, MacFarlane subscribes to the following reflexive truth norm: 
 
RTN — An agent is permitted to assert that p at context c1 only if p is true 
as used at c1 and assessed from c1. (MacFarlane 2014: 103) 
 
RTN is a bridge principle linking semantics and pragmatics. It says that the truth 
of an assertion made at c1 and assessed from c1 is a necessary condition for the 
permissibility of the asserting at c1. However, if RTN were the only normative 
principle there would be no practical difference between AR and NIC since the 
assessment context plays no distinctive role there: whenever we make an assertion 
in a context we are also assessing it from that same context. NIC and relativism 
turn out to be normatively equivalent theories according to RTN. This means that 
RTN doesn’t give us the full story concerning the normative significance of AR. 
 
It is only when we turn to a different conversational phenomenon—that of 
retracting—that the operational difference between NIC and AR is appreciable. By 
‘retraction’ MacFarlane means the speech act one performs in saying ‘I take that 
back’ or ‘I retract that’.  The target of retraction is a previously made but 
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unretracted speech act (e.g., an assertion). As any other speech act, retraction has 
its distinctive normative profile which MacFarlane characterizes as follows 
(Retraction Norm): 
 
RN An agent in context c2 is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion 
of p made at c1 if p is not true as used at c1 and assessed from c2. 
(MacFarlane 2014: 108) 
 
RN is a prescriptive norm—it says that the untruth of a proposition as used at c1 
and assessed from c2 is sufficient to require retracting a previous assertion of it. 
The effect of retracting is that of rendering the previous assertion null and void—
to disavow the assertoric commitments undertaken in the original assertion. 
 
With both RN and RTN on board, we can fully appreciate the practical difference 
between NIC and AR. Because NIC does not distinguish operationally between a 
context of assertion and a context of assessment, when it is equipped with a 
retraction norm it predicts that a subject ought to retract a previously unretracted 
assertion just in case that assertion was impermissible—i.e. it expressed a false 
proposition in the context in which it was performed. By contrast, AR predicts that 
a subject is required to retract an assertion whenever the proposition it expresses is 
false from her current context of assessment regardless of whether such an 
assertion was deemed permissible by RTN. To illustrate: suppose that in c1 I like 
oysters and I assert “oysters are tasty” but in c2 I change my tastes and I no longer 
enjoy oysters. AR—but not NIC—predicts that at c2 I am required to retract my 
assertion of “oysters are tasty” made at c1 since the proposition it expressed is 
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assessed as false in c2, even though that assertion was permissible in c1 according 
to RTN. 
 
7. Assessing assessment relativism  
AR is an ingenious proposal which sets a milestone in the history of relativism. 
The view is, however, not immune to criticisms. Among the many objections that 
have been raised against AR,9 I’ll just mention two issues in relation to retraction 
and faultless disagreement. 
 
Recall, an act of retraction targets a previously made speech act—e.g. an act of 
asserting—not its content. However, according to RN, what triggers the 
requirement to retract are characteristics of the asserted proposition, namely its 
untruth relative to the context of assessment where the retraction takes place. By 
retracting, an agent undoes the normative changes effected by her assertion in the 
original context with the result that she “is no longer obliged to respond to 
challenges to the assertion […], and that others are no longer entitled to rely on 
[her] authority for the accuracy of this assertion”.10 However, in retracting an 
agent is not required to admit fault, and for two reasons: first, given that RN states 
that the untruth of a proposition is only a sufficient condition for the obligatoriness 
                                                        
9 Just to mention a few criticisms: for objections against the application of AR to 
(i) epistemic modals see Ross and Schroeder 2013, Von Fintel and Gillies 2008, 
Wright 2007; (ii) to future contingent see Moruzzi and Wright 2008, Brogaard 
2008, Dietz and Murzi 2013; (iii) to knowledge ascription see Brendel 2014, 
Kompa 2002, and Wright 2017.  
10 MacFarlane 2014: 108. 
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of retracting, nothing precludes an agent to retract an assertion which is true as 
assessed from her context of assessment. Second, even when a subject is required 
to retract, the retracted assertion might have complied with RTN when it was 
made in the original context of assertion. In both cases, an attribution of fault is 
inappropriate.  
 
Do we need AR and the specific sense of retraction that MacFarlane has in mind to 
obtain this normative effect? I’m inclined to agree with Marques 2018 and 
Raffman 2016 that we do not. Let’s consider an example concerning matters of 
taste: until the age of twenty I didn’t like the taste of mustard and, as I recall now, 
I’ve asserted several times “mustard is disgusting”. Then my taste sensibility 
changed and I started liking mustard. During a dinner at which my mother has 
prepared mustard, noticing, with surprise, that I’m the first to grab some mustard, 
she claims: “Didn’t you think mustard is disgusting?”. To that I reply: “Well, I’ve 
changed my mind, and I no longer stand by my previous assertion”. Let’s label 
this speech act withdrawing. Everybody at dinner would take my withdrawing to 
signal my intention of distancing myself from my previous assertions that mustard 
is disgusting and in fact to withholding from the assertoric commitments 
engendered by my previous assertions. This, as expected, does not involve an 
admission of fault for having asserted in the past that mustard is disgusting: since I 
disliked mustard, I consider my previous assertions as perfectly reasonable.  
 
What I did with my withdrawing is thus: (i) to deny that mustard is disgusting, and 
(ii) to manifest my disposition to withhold from the assertoric commitments 
associated with my previous assertions. It thus seems that my withdrawing would 
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achieve the normative revisions that characterize an act of retraction without, 
however, requiring AR. An advocate of NIC, for instance, could easily account for 
the normative effect of my withdrawing. The challenge for an advocate of AR is 
thus to individuate some normative effects distinctive of retraction that are not 
already carried out by an act of withdrawing.11 
 
The second issue concerns what I take to be an ingredient, and important, part of 
the folk conception of faultless disagreement, namely the idea that the 
faultlessness of certain kinds of disagreement can be appreciated and coherently 
expressed not just from the abstract point of view of the formal framework of AR, 
but also from within a committed perspective taking part to the dispute. Wright 
calls this extra ingredient parity, and according to him it is “meant to be 
implicated by faultlessness—conveyed in the acknowledgment that your opinion 
is just as good as mine”.12 For this reason, intuitions about parity are arguably 
explanatorily prior to intuitions about faultlessness: it is because disputants think 
that their opinions are roughly on a par that they think that the disagreement 
between them is faultless. A fully satisfactory account of the phenomenon of 
faultless disagreement must include an account of the parity ingredient.  
 
Can AR account for it? In its current form, it does not seem that it can. The gist of 
the argument is the following. Suppose I disagree with John about whether oysters 
are tasty: I claim they are tasty while John claims they are not. My assessment 
context is one in which the proposition that oysters are tasty is true: relatively to 
                                                        
11 See Ferrari 2016b for a criticism of MacFarlane’s take on retraction. 
12 Wright 2012: 439. 
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that context the proposition that oysters aren’t tasty is assessed as false. But that’s 
exactly what John has asserted. So how can I judge from within my context of 
assessment that John’s assertion is on a par with mine if what I’ve claimed is true 
while what John has claimed is false—as assessed from my context of 
assessment?13 If an attribution of falsity carries some normative weight—as it 
should do14—it seems that I cannot but assess John’s claim to be not on a par with 
mine: after all it expresses a proposition I’m committed to assess as false. It is thus 
clear that the framework of AR, as it stands, does not allow for the possibility of 
expressing equal legitimacy of contrary opinions within a committed perspective. 
This isn’t, of course, meant to be a conclusive objection to AR: it just illustrates 
that more work has to be done by an advocate of AR both on the normative 
functions of truth and falsity and on the metaphysics of taste.15, 16  
                                                        
13 Cf. MacFarlane 2014, pp. 106-107. 
14 Cf. Wright 1992, Ch. 1. 
15 Ferrari 2016c develops some suggestions for how to improve AR with a 
pluralist conception of the normative function(s) of truth. Ferrari 2016a and 
Ferrari 2018 gove a full account of normative alethic pluralism in relation to a 
comparative analysis of disagreement in different domains. 
16 I’d like to thank Elke Brendel, Manuel García-Carpintero, Andrea Crepoli, 
Martin Kusch, Teresa Marques, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Stefano Pugnaghi, Elisabetta 
Sassarini, and Dan Zeman for their useful feedback. Moreover, I’d like to 
acknowledge the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG—BR 
1978/3–1) for sponsoring my postdoc at the University of Bonn. While working 
on this paper, I have benefitted from participation in the Pluralisms Global 
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